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Abstract
We extend the basic model of trade protection with special interest
groups developed in Grossman and Helpman (1994) to include monopo-
listic competition with variable markups. We ﬁnd the following results: (i)
for sectors organized into lobbies the endogenous import tariﬀ is always
positive and inversely related to the degree of import penetration; (ii) for
unorganized sectors the endogenous import policy may be a tariﬀ or a
subsidy, depending on the policy implemented by the partner country;
(iii) the endogenous export policy consists in an export tax for unorga-
nized sectors and in a subsidy for organized sector provided that goods
are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
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1 Introduction
Free trade is often the welfare maximizing choice in many theoretical models and
frequently advocated in international policy frameworks. However, when trade
policy comes into play, free trade is rarely chosen by individual countries and
not easily chosen by groups of countries. There are a number of explanations
for this discrepancy between theory and practice. One is that real markets are
not perfectly competitive and there are market imperfections. Another reason
is that politics matters and there are many sources of strategic interactions to
be taken into account.
A vast literature has been written on this topic, however one of the most
inﬂuential papers is the one by Grossman and Helpman (1994) (henceforth GH),
which is among the ﬁrsts to develop a formal micro-founded model with clear-
cut testable predictions about the cross-sectional structure of protection. In
their model trade policy endogenously emerges from the interaction between
government and organized sectoral lobbies. GH show that, within a perfectly
competitive framework where free trade is the social optimum, the structure
of protection that emerges in the political equilibrium entails an import tariﬀ
(export subsidy) in organized sectors and an import subsidy (export tax) in
unorganized sectors. Moreover, the level of protection is positively related to the
import penetration ratio for unorganized sectors and negatively for organized
sectors, while the opposite holds for import elasticity. These predictions are
conﬁrmed by many empirical studies, such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). However, the same studies often ﬁnd that
lobbies seem to have surprising little power over the government, which is not
in line with the GH model. As a matter of fact, the unexpectedly benevolent
government is the very puzzle of empirical studies on the protection for sale
type of models. In addition, the GH model predicts that unorganized industries
should receive negative protection (e.g. an import subsidy), while according to
the empirical evidence, industries classiﬁed as unorganized receive positive levels
of trade protection.1
In a subsequent paper Grossman and Helpman (see Grossman and Helpman
1995) study endogenous protection in a two-country setting, where terms of
trade are operative. In this context, the optimum tariﬀ (or export tax) argument
for protection delivers a motive for taxing international trade also in unorganized
sectors.
A number of further extensions of the GH model have been proposed. For
instance, Mitra (1999) endogenizes lobbies formation; heterogeneous ﬁrms are
considered in Bombardini (2005); Matschk and Sherlund (2006) incorporate
labor unions and labor mobility into the model; Facchini et al. (2006) develop
a quota version of the GH model; trade in intermediate inputs is introduced in
Gawande et al. (2012). Despite these models demonstrate that additional factors
can enrich the original framework, yet the core of the GH model and its basic
predictions remain unchanged.
An interesting extension of the baseline model, relevant for this paper, is
found in Chang (2005), who considers the case of monopolistic competition à
la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The predictions of this model depart from the
original ones in three fundamental ways: ﬁrst, the equilibrium outcome entails
1On this matter see Ederington and Minier (2008).
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protection in all sectors, whether organized or not; second, the imperfectly com-
petitive structure of the economy implies that free-trade is no more the welfare
maximizing choice; third the level of protection always varies inversely with the
import penetration ratio (in GH this happens in organized sectors only). These
results are mainly driven by the degree of market power of ﬁrms, which intro-
duces linkages between sectors (cross-price eﬀects) and rivalry between lobbies.
As a consequence, individual lobbies have a smaller incentive to ask for protec-
tion. Furthermore, although the model takes lobbies as exogenous, the scope for
lobby formation seems reduced with respect to the GH model: since unorganized
sectors will be protected anyway, they have an incentive to act as free riders.
A speciﬁc feature of the Chang (2005) paper is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz
market structure, which implies that markups are constant, so ruling out, by
construction, any possible terms of trade eﬀects from the analysis. In this paper
we relax this assumption by introducing monopolistic competition with variable
markups into a model with special interest groups, where trade policy is the
result of a political calculus as in GH. One immediate implication is that do-
mestic and foreign producer prices reﬂect the government interventions in trade,
so that equilibrium trade policies now depend on the rich interplay of diﬀerent
mechanisms, namely: (i) the political support motive for trade interventions, due
to the campaign contributions of organized sectors able to inﬂuence government
decisions; (ii) the imperfect-competition motive for trade protection reﬂecting
the non-optimality of free trade in a non-competitive setting; (iii) the terms-
of-trade motive for trade protection related to the existence of a certain degree
of strategic interactions among ﬁrms in a monopolistic competition framework
allowing for variable markups. It should be noted that the ﬁrst force drives the
main results in the GH seminal paper, while in Chang (2005) results stem from
the interactions between the ﬁrst and the second forces. Finally, in Grossman
and Helpman (1995), where the small-country assumption is removed and bor-
der prices depend on purchases and sales, trade protection is the result of the
ﬁrst and of the third motives.
Our results can be summarized as follows. For sectors organized into interest
groups the endogenous import tariﬀ is always positive and inversely related to
the degree of import penetration; for unorganized sectors the endogenous im-
port policy can be a tariﬀ or a subsidy, depending on the policy implemented by
the partner country, and is inversely related to the level of import penetration,
provided that the relative weight the government attaches to aggregate welfare
and/or the gross markup on domestic sales are relatively high; under general
conditions, namely a suﬃcient high degree of product diﬀerentiation, the en-
dogenous export policy consists in an export subsidy for organized sectors and
in an export tax for unorganized sectors.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline
the imperfectly competitive model and describe the tariﬀ setting game. Section
3 presents the equilibrium structure of trade protection, taking as given trade
policy of the rest of the world. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Framework of Analysis
In order to study endogenous protection in an economy characterized by im-
perfect competition and variable markups we consider an analytically tractable
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model which we describe in the present section.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
Consider an economy with n sectors each of which presenting a continuum of
ﬁrms in the space [0, 1] producing horizontally diﬀerentiated goods (i.e. the
total mass of ﬁrms is equal to one in each sector). The economy is populated by
individuals with identical preferences, but diﬀerent factor endowments:
U = x0 +
n∑
i=1
Ui(xi), (1)
where x0 is the quantity of the homogeneous good 0 and Ui(·) is the sub-utility
function deﬁned on the set xi of diﬀerentiated goods of sector i. Ui(·) is assumed
to be symmetric, diﬀerentiable, increasing in all its arguments and strictly con-
cave.2 Diﬀerent varieties of each good are perceived as imperfect substitutes
by consumers who have a taste for variety. Let λi (1 − λi) be the fraction of
domestic (foreign) ﬁrms of sector i. We assume that for each sector i the utility
function Ui(·) takes the following form:
Ui(xi) = αi
(∫ λi
0
xhi,kdk +
∫ 1−λi
0
xfi,kdk
)
+ (2)
−βi − γi
2
(∫ λi
0
x2hi,kdk +
∫ 1−λi
0
x2fi,kdk
)
−γi
2
(∫ λi
0
xhi,kdk +
∫ 1−λi
0
xfi,kdk
)2
,
where xhi,k (xfi,k) is the quantity of the generic k-variety produced domesti-
cally (abroad) and all parameters are assumed to be positive. In particular, αi
indicates the intensity of consumers' preferences for diﬀerentiated goods belong-
ing to sector i; the parameter γi measures the degree of substitution between
any pair of varieties given βi, so that goods are substitutes, independent, or
complements according to whether γi Q 0. The larger γi the closer substitutes
goods are. If βi were allowed to be equal to γi, then goods would be perfect
substitutes and the utility function would degenerate into a standard quadratic
utility deﬁned over a homogeneous product. In what follows we assume that
βi > γi > 0, implying that consumers love variety.
The homogeneous good is produced in both regions under perfect competi-
tion and constant returns to scale and can be freely traded. We shall use this
good as the numéraire (i.e. the price p0 = 1). Let Y denote the income of the
representative consumer and phi,k (pfi,k) be the price of the domestic (foreign)
variety. Further, let τi > 0 (τi < 0) denote the speciﬁc import tariﬀ (subsidy)
for sector i and si > 0 (si < 0) represent the speciﬁc export subsidy (tax). In
what follows, when necessary, we use star superscripts to denote foreign vari-
ables. Hence, by symmetry, τ∗i and s
∗
i represent the trade policy instruments of
the foreign country. We also assume that the rest of the world is characterized
by the same preference structure.
2As is well known the use of a quasi-linear utility function leads to neglect income eﬀects.
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The budget constraint of the typical individual immediately follows:
x0 +
n∑
i=1
(∫ λi
0
phi,kxhi,kdk +
∫ 1−λi
0
(pfi,k + τi − s∗i )xfi,kdk
)
= Y. (3)
Although parameters are sector-speciﬁc, henceforth for the sake of simplicity,
we will assume that preference parameters α, β, γ are the same across sectors
and drop the i-index. Solving the consumer's problem of utility maximization
subject to the budget constraint yields, for each generic k variety of sector i,
the following direct demand functions for home and foreign varieties:
xhi,k =
α
β
− 1
β − γ phi,k +
γ
β (β − γ)Pi, (4)
xfi,k =
α
β
− 1
β − γ (pfi,k + τi − s
∗
i ) +
γ
β (β − γ)Pi, (5)
where Pi ≡
∫ λi
0
phi,kdk +
∫ 1−λi
0
(pfi,k + τi − s∗i ) dk is the consumer price index
in the domestic market. By symmetry, in the foreign market we have:
x∗fi,k =
α
β
− 1
β − γ p
∗
fi,k +
γ
β (β − γ)P
∗
i , (6)
x∗hi,k =
α
β
− 1
β − γ
(
p∗hi,k + τ
∗
i − si
)
+
γ
β (β − γ)P
∗
i , (7)
where P ∗i ≡
∫ λi
0
(
p∗hi,k + τ
∗
i − si
)
dk+
∫ 1−λi
0
p∗fi,kdk is the consumer price index
in the foreign market.
The numéraire good is produced with labor only under constant returns to
scale and an input-output coeﬃcient equal to one. We also assume that the
aggregate supply of labor is large enough for the numéraire to be produced,
which implies that the wage rate is equal to 1 for the economy. Diﬀerentiated
goods require labor, with a unit cost ci, and a sector-speciﬁc factor mi, which is
inelastically supplied. The rest of the world has access to the same technology
in each sector.
Given the above assumptions, domestic ﬁrms proﬁts for the ﬁrm operating
in sector i and producing variety k can be written as:
Πi,k = (phi,k − ci)xhi,kN +
(
p∗hi,k − ci
)
x∗hi,kN
∗ −mi, (8)
where Πhi,k denotes proﬁts, N (N
∗) is the total population at home (abroad),
p∗hi,k is the producer price in the foreign market.
The typical domestic ﬁrm will choose phi,k and p
∗
hi,k so as to maximize
proﬁts, given the demand functions (4) and (7), but neglecting the impact of its
decision over the two price indices Pi and P
∗
i prevailing in both markets.
The ﬁrst-order conditions to this optimization problem read as:
phi =
α (β − γ) + βci
2β − γλi +
γ(1− λi)
2β − γλi (pfi + τi − s
∗
i ) , (9)
p∗hi =
α (β − γ) + βci
2β − γλi +
γ (1− λi)
2β − γλi p
∗
fi −
β − γλi
2β − γλi (τ
∗
i − si) , (10)
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where we have imposed symmetry among varieties and made use of the deﬁni-
tions for Pi and P
∗
i . Equations (9) and (10) can be interpreted as best reaction
functions of the typical domestic producers to the prices set by foreign produc-
ers operating in the same sector. This is a speciﬁc feature of an economy with
diﬀerentiated goods and quadratic utility function: on the one hand, each ﬁrm
neglects the impact of its pricing decisions on the aggregate market variables, on
the other is aware that the aggregate market variables may inﬂuence its behav-
ior. The corresponding optimal conditions for foreign producers can be obtained
by symmetry.
By combing the optimal conditions we obtain equilibrium prices:
phi = p
FT
i +
γ (1− λi)
2 (2β − γ) (τi − s
∗
i ) , (11)
pfi = p
FT
i −
2 (β − γ) + γλi
2 (2β − γ) (τi − s
∗
i ) , (12)
p∗hi = p
FT
i −
2 (β − γ) + γ (1− λi)
2 (2β − γ) (τ
∗
i − si) , (13)
p∗fi = p
FT
i +
γλi
2 (2β − γ) (τ
∗
i − si) , (14)
where pFTi =
α(β−γ)+βci
2β−γ denotes the price that would prevail under free trade
or if import tariﬀs (subsidies) were set so as to countervail export subsidies
(taxes), (i.e. τi = s
∗
i and τ
∗
i = si, respectively). From (11)-(14) we observe that
in this setting there are terms of trade eﬀects from trade policy, so that domestic
(foreign) producer prices in the home market are increasing (decreasing) in τi
and decreasing (increasing) in s∗i . Quadratic preferences, in fact, implies variable
elasticity of substitution between pairs of diﬀerent varieties so delivering variable
markups.
Using these results into (4)-(7) gives the equilibrium quantities:
xhi = x
FT
i +
1
β − γ
γ (1− λi)
2 (2β − γ) (τi − s
∗
i ) , (15)
xfi = x
FT
i −
1
β − γ
2 (β − γ) + γλi
2 (2β − γ) (τi − s
∗
i ) , (16)
x∗hi = x
FT
i −
1
β − γ
2 (β − γ) + γ (1− λi)
2 (2β − γ) (τ
∗
i − si) , (17)
x∗fi = x
FT
i +
1
β − γ
γλi
2 (2β − γ) (τ
∗
i − si) , (18)
where xFTi =
α−ci
2β−γ is the equilibrium quantity for each generic variety k of
sector i that would prevail under free trade or if import tariﬀs (subsidies) were
set so as to countervail export subsidies (taxes), (i.e. τi = s
∗
i and τ
∗
i = si).
Foreign (domestic) ﬁrms' exports xfi (x
∗
hi), are positive if and only if τi − s∗i <
2(β−γ)(α−ci)
2(β−γ)+γλi (τ
∗
i − si < 2(β−γ)(α−ci)2(β−γ)+γ(1−λi) ). It can be easily shown that if these
conditions hold then ﬁrms' export prices will be strictly larger than zero. Since
these inequalities restrict the feasibility set of trade policy, in what follows we
will restrict our analysis to trade policy parameter combinations satisfying these
inequalities.
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2.2 Government, Lobbies and Welfare Measures
Turning to the public sector, we constrain the set of policy instruments available
to the government to import tariﬀs (or subsidy) and export subsidies (or tax).
The net revenue expressed in per-capita terms is found to be:
R (τ, s) =
n∑
i=1
(1− λi) τixfi − N
∗
N
n∑
i=1
λisix
∗
hi, (19)
where τ and s denote n-dimension vectors of import and export policy instru-
ments and the government is assumed to redistribute net revenue R (τ, s) to
each individual .
Following GH the typical individual derives income from wages, public trans-
fers and from the ownership of some sector-speciﬁc inputs, which are assumed
to be indivisible and nontradable. Let L deﬁne the set of owners of the speciﬁc
factors who have been able to form lobby groups. Lobbies compete with each
other to attempt to inﬂuence government's decisions in the formulation of trade
policy by oﬀering political contributions. Let Ci (τ, s) denote the political contri-
bution function of sector i contingent on the trade policy set by the government
and Vi = Wi − Ci denote the joint welfare where:
Wi (τ, s) = li + Πi (τi, si) + σiN [R (τ, s) + S(τ)] , (20)
is the gross welfare of members of lobby i, where li denotes labor income of
workers in sector i, Πi (τi, si) represents the operational proﬁts, σi is the fraction
of population that owns the speciﬁc factor used in i and S (τ) denotes consumer
surplus given by the utility derived from diﬀerentiated goods minus expenditure
on diﬀerentiated goods. As is well known, in this policy game, contributions
schedules are truthful that is, a group contribution reﬂects exactly the group's
willingness to pay for a change in trade policy (see Bernheim and Whinston
1986). The policy objective function of the government immediately follows:
G (τ, s) =
∑
i∈L
Ci (τ, s) + aW (τ, s) , (21)
where the parameter a > 0 measures the relative weight the government attaches
to aggregate welfareW (τ, s) (i.e. the lower a the higher the degree of corruption)
which, in turn, is given by
W (τ, s) = l +
n∑
i=1
Πi (τi, si) +N [R (τ, s) + S (τ)] , (22)
with l being aggregate labor income. Finally, since contribution schedules are
truthful, the government objective function is equivalent to:
G˜ (τ, s) =
∑
i∈L
Wi (τ, s) + aW (τ, s) . (23)
3 The Equilibrium Level of Protection with Vari-
able Markups
In this Section we derive the equilibrium structure of protection emerging in the
domestic economy, taking as given the trade policy of the foreign country. Before
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doing so fully, we ﬁrst analyze how trade policy is likely to aﬀect individual
lobbies welfare and aggregate welfare. For the sake of exposition, we ﬁrst study
the equilibrium import policy and then the equilibrium export policy.
3.1 Import Trade Policy
Consider the eﬀects of import protection on the welfare of the generic individual
lobby i. From (20) we have that the welfare eﬀect for lobby i of a marginal
increase in τj is
∂Wi (τ, s)
∂τj
= δij
Πi (τi, si)
∂τj
+ σiN
[
∂R (τ, s)
∂τj
+
∂S(τ)
∂τj
]
, (24)
= δijλjN
[
∂phj
∂τj
xhj + (phj − cj) ∂xhj
∂τj
]
+
+σiN
[
(1− λj)
(
∂xfj
∂τj
τj − ∂pfj
∂τj
xfj
)
− λj ∂phj
∂τj
xhj
]
,
where δij is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if j = i and to zero otherwise, that
is to say that import policy in other sectors aﬀects the aggregate welfare of lobby
i only through the eﬀects that this policy entails on the redistributed revenues
and on consumers' surplus. The ﬁrst term refers to the welfare gains deriving
from the ownership of the speciﬁc factor j consisting in increased revenues stem-
ming from higher sales and higher prices. The second term refers to the losses
suﬀered as consumers, deriving from lower consumption of the foreign varieties
and higher prices on domestic varieties, net of the beneﬁts deriving from the
reduction of the producer prices on foreign varieties. Intuitively, given this terms
of trade eﬀect from trade policy, the sum of tariﬀ revenues and consumer surplus
is not maximized at zero import tariﬀ.
Given the above expression we have the following result.
Lemma 1. Starting from zero restriction on imports (i.e. τj = 0): (i) A lobby
would prefer an import tariﬀ for its own sector for any feasible foreign export
policy, i.e. s∗j > − 2(β−γ)(α−ci)2(β−γ)+γλj ; (ii) a lobby would prefer an import tariﬀ for
other sectors if s∗j > − 4(β−γ)
2(α−cj)
4(β−γ)2+γλj(4β−3γ) and a subsidy if −
2(β−γ)(α−cj)
2(β−γ)+γλj <
s∗j < − 4(β−γ)
2(α−cj)
4(β−γ)2+γλj(4β−3γ) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus as a corollary to Lemma 1, we get
Corollary. Starting from free trade (i.e. τj = s
∗
j = 0), a lobby would prefer an
import tariﬀ for its own sector as well as for the other sectors.
The intuition for the above result is straightforward.
Starting from zero tariﬀs on imports for any feasible foreign export policy,
a lobby i would beneﬁt from import protection on its own sector through the
positive eﬀect that trade protection would have on its proﬁts and on the sum
of the redistributed tariﬀ revenues and surplus gains due to the improvement
in the terms of trade deriving from protection. Intuitively, the additional gains
deriving from terms of trade eﬀects ensure that even in the case of export taxes
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levied by the foreign country, it would be convenient to ask for a positive import
tariﬀ. According to the second part of the Lemma 1, the positive eﬀects of terms
of trade improvement also prevail with regards to the welfare implications of
trade policy in sectors either than i, provided that the export subsidy set by
the foreign country is higher than a certain critical level, otherwise an import
subsidy for other sectors will be preferred by the organized sector i.
Note that in GH a lobby will always prefer an import subsidy for other
sectors since this would reduce the price of imports as well as the price on
domestically produced varieties. In Chang (2005), instead, since the price of the
domestic output is not aﬀected by an import subsidy a lobby always prefer a
zero import tariﬀ for the other sectors.
Consider now the impact on aggregate welfare of small changes in τj . From
(22) we have:
∂W (τ, s)
∂τj
=
∂Πj (τj , sj)
∂τj
+N
[
∂R (τ, s)
∂τj
+
∂S(τ)
∂τj
]
, (25)
= N
[
λj (phj − cj) ∂xhj
∂τj
+ (1− λj)
(
∂xfj
∂τj
τj − ∂pfj
∂τj
xfj
)]
.
Given the prices and quantities derived in the previous Section we have the
following result:
Lemma 2. Starting from zero restrictions on imports (i.e. τj = 0) aggregate
welfare is increasing in import tariﬀ in any sector for any feasible foreign export
policy.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2 simply states that the welfare-maximizing speciﬁc import tariﬀ is
positive for any feasible level of foreign export policy as a result of the beneﬁcial
eﬀects that a tariﬀ has on proﬁts of domestic producers (due to imperfect compe-
tition) and on consumers' surplus, thank to the lower producer prices on foreign
varieties (i.e. terms of trade gains). This result is consistent with Chang (2005),
where the positive eﬀect on proﬁts makes a tariﬀ always desirable.3 However, the
result is in contrast with GH, where the benchmark welfare-maximizing policy
is free trade for all sectors, since their setup features perfect competition.
We are now ready to study the equilibrium structure of protection. First,
consider the marginal eﬀect of a tariﬀ on the government objective function
(23):
∂G˜ (τ, s)
∂τj
= (Ij + a)
∂Πj (τj , sj)
∂τj
+ (a+ σL)N
[
∂R (τ, s)
∂τj
+
∂S(τ)
∂τj
]
,
= (Ij + a)λjN
[
∂phj
∂τj
xhj + (phj − cj) ∂xhj
∂τj
]
+ (26)
+ (a+ σL)N
[
(1− λj)
(
∂xfj
∂τj
τj − ∂pfj
∂τj
xfj
)
− λj ∂phj
∂τj
xhj
]
,
where Ij =
∑
i∈L
δj is an indicator variable such that Ij = 1 if j ∈ L and Ij = 0 if
j /∈ L, while σL =
∑
j∈L
σj is the fraction of the population represented by lobbies.
3See also Gros (1987) and Flam and Helpman (1987) who show that in a small country
the optimal tariﬀ is strictly positive for a monopolistically competitive sector.
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Let τo denote the equilibrium import policy, then one must have that:
∂G˜(τo,s)
∂τj
= 0 and ∂
2G˜(τo,s)
∂τ2j
< 0.
From (26) we have that the equilibrium tariﬀ must satisfy the following
ﬁrst-order condition:
τoj
∂xfj
∂τj
=
∂pfj
∂τj
xfj − Ij − σL
a+ σL
λj
1− λj
∂phj
∂τj
xhj − Ij + a
a+ σL
λj
1− λj
∂xhj
∂τj
(phj − cj) .
(27)
The second-order condition requires the following restriction on parameters:
Ij + a
a+ σL
<
[2 (β − γ) + γλj ] (6β − 4γ + γλj)
2λjγ2 (1− λj) +
1
2
. (28)
Clearly the above condition always holds under the assumption that goods of
the same sector are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (i.e. the coeﬃcient β − γ is large
enough). Henceforth, we assume that (28) always holds. Given these results the
following proposition summarizes our ﬁndings.
Proposition 1. If the contribution schedules of the lobbies are truthful, then
starting from zero restrictions on imports (i.e. τj = 0): (i) The government will
set an import tariﬀ in the organized sector; for σL < a, the government will set
an import tariﬀ in the unorganized sector; for σL > a, the government will set
an import tariﬀ (subsidy) in the unorganized sector if:
s∗j > (<)− 4(β−γ)[(β−γ)(a+σL)+γλja](α−cj)[4(β−γ)2+γλj(4β−3γ)](a+σL)−2γ2λj(1−λj)a .
Proof. See the Appendix.
This corollary immediately follows:
Corollary. Starting from free trade (i.e. τj = s
∗
j = 0), the government will set
an import tariﬀ in any sector whether organized or not.
According to Proposition 1 the equilibrium import tariﬀ is always positive
for the organized sectors, while for the unorganized sectors the equilibrium im-
port policy will depend on the level of the foreign export subsidy. In particular,
an import tariﬀ will be levied on imports in the unorganized sectors if the export
subsidy set by the foreign country is higher than a certain critical level, otherwise
an import subsidy will be set. Our results stand in contrast with those obtained
in GH, where the endogenous import policy is always a subsidy for the unor-
ganized sectors. In the monopolistic competition framework of Chang (1995),
instead, the government will always choose to set an import tariﬀ whether or
not a sector is represented by a lobby.
To gain some intuition it is useful to express the equilibrium import policy
for the home country (27) as follows:
τoj
pfj
=
1
εffj
− Ij − σL
a+ σL
zj
εfhj
− Ij + a
a+ σL
zj
εffj/εhfj
µj − 1
µj
, (29)
where zj =
phjxhj
pfjxfj
λj
1−λj is the inverse import penetration ratio in equilibrium,
that is the equilibrium market share of domestic products relative to that
of the imported products at producer price, εffj =
(
∂xfj
∂τj
/
∂pfj
∂τj
)
pfj
xfj
> 0,
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εfhj =
(
∂xfj
∂τj
/
∂phj
∂τj
)
phj
xfj
< 0, εhfj =
(
∂xhj
∂τj
/
∂pfj
∂τj
)
pfj
xhj
< 0 and µ = phj/cj
is the (variable) gross markup on domestic sales. Equation (29) expresses the
equilibrium import policy as the sum of three components. The ﬁrst component
captures the terms-of-trade motive for trade protection and represents an addi-
tional motive for deviating from free trade. In an environment with diﬀerentiated
goods and variable markups, in fact, there is an additional argument in favor
of trade protection similar to that of a large country with homogenous goods
and perfect competition. The second component captures the political support
motive for trade interventions and has the same nature of the expression for the
equilibrium import policy in GH resulting from the balance between the losses
associated to trade policies and the income gains that organized sectors can ob-
tain from such policies. Finally, the third component can be interpreted as the
imperfect-competition motive for trade protection reﬂecting the positive eﬀects
on proﬁts derived from the imposition of an import tariﬀ. This last component
is in fact increasing in the markup on domestic sales.
From the above expression it is clear that having higher domestic production
relative to foreign production (low level of import penetration) will imply higher
import tariﬀs for organized sectors, while the eﬀect on import tariﬀs or subsidies
for unorganized sectors is likely to be negative only if the relative weight the
government attaches to aggregate welfare a is relatively low and/or the gross
markup on domestic sales is low.
3.2 Export Trade Policy
We now consider the eﬀects of an export subsidy on the welfare of the generic
individual lobby i. From (20) we have that the welfare eﬀect for lobby i of a
marginal increase in sj is
∂Wi (τ, s)
∂sj
= δij
Πi (τi, si)
∂sj
+ σiN
[
∂R (τ, s)
∂sj
+
∂S(τ)
∂sj
]
, (30)
= δijλjN
∗
[
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj +
(
p∗hj − cj
) ∂x∗hj
∂sj
]
+
−λjσiN∗
(
x∗hj + sj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
)
,
As in the case of a tariﬀ, the ﬁrst term refers to the welfare gains deriving from
the ownership of the speciﬁc factor j consisting in increased revenues stemming
from higher sales and higher prices. On the contrary, within the second term the
eﬀect on domestic consumers surplus is zero, while the export subsidy entails a
cost on each exported unit.
Given the above expression we have the following result.
Lemma 3. Starting from a zero subsidy on exports (i.e. sj = 0), for any feasible
foreign import tariﬀ (i.e. τ∗j <
2(β−γ)
2(β−γ)+γ(1−λj) (α− ci)): (i) a lobby would prefer
an export subsidy for its own sector, if goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated; (ii)
a lobby would prefer an export tax for other sectors.
Proof. see the Appendix.
An export subsidy on sector i makes exporting more proﬁtable for sector i
only, while its cost is spread across the entire population. A lobby will hence
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ask for an export subsidy for its own sector, since it will get all the proﬁts while
paying only a fraction of the cost. On the other hand, by asking for an export
tax for the other sector, the lobby will get part of the tax income. This result
is in line with the ﬁndings of Chang (2005) and GH.
Consider now the impact on aggregate welfare of small changes in sj . From
(22) we have:
∂W (τ, s)
∂sj
=
∂
n∑
i=1
Πi (τi, si)
∂sj
+N
[
∂R (τ, s)
∂sj
+
∂S(τ)
∂sj
]
, (31)
= λjN
∗
[
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj +
(
p∗hj − cj
) ∂x∗hj
∂sj
]
− λjN∗
(
x∗hj + sj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
)
which implies the following result.
Lemma 4. Starting from a zero subsidy on exports (i.e. sj = 0) aggregate
welfare is decreasing in export subsidy in any sector for any feasible foreign
import policy.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Intuitively, an export tax is socially desirable, as it generates a ﬁscal revenue
that outweighs the proﬁt loss from exporters, while not aﬀecting domestic con-
sumers. Again this result is similar to that found in Chang (2005), while under
perfect competition free trade is still the ﬁrst best, as in GH.
Consider now the marginal eﬀect of an export subsidy on the government
objective function (23):
∂G˜ (τ, s)
∂sj
= (Ij + a)
∂Πi (τi, si)
∂sj
+ (a+ σL)N
(
∂R (τ, s)
∂sj
+
∂S(τ)
∂sj
)
,
= (Ij + a)λjN
∗
[
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj +
(
p∗hj − cj
) ∂x∗hj
∂sj
]
+ (32)
− (a+ σL)λjN∗
(
x∗hj + sj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
)
.
Let so denote the equilibrium export policy, then one must have that ∂G˜(τ,s
o)
∂sj
=
0 and ∂
2G˜(τ,so)
∂s2j
< 0. Then, the equilibrium tariﬀ must satisfy the following
ﬁrst-order condition:
soj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
=
Ij + a
a+ σL
[
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj +
(
p∗hj − cj
) ∂x∗hj
∂sj
]
− x∗hj . (33)
The second-order condition requires the following restriction on parameters:
Ij + a
a+ σL
< 2
2β − γ
2β − γ − γλj . (34)
Note that the above condition poses a limit both on the degree of product
diﬀerentiation (i.e. β − γ) and on the bias the government has towards lobby
interests (i.e. a not too small).
Given the above expressions, we are now ready to characterize the equilib-
rium trade policy for the exporting sectors. In particular, we have the following
result.
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Proposition 2. If the contribution schedules of the lobbies are truthful, then
starting from zero restrictions on exports (i.e. sj = 0): (i) the government will
set an export subsidy for organized sectors, if goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated;
(ii) the government will set an export tax for unorganized sectors.
Proof. See the Appendix
This result is consistent with GH's results. The interpretation for the export
tax in unorganized sectors is straightforward as the governments has only a rela-
tively small incentive to deviate from what is socially optimal. For the organized
sectors, instead, a positive export subsidy will be chosen due to government
interest in campaign contributions, provided that products are suﬃciently dif-
ferentiated. In the case of low diﬀerentiation, however, a positive export subsidy
may still emerge in the political equilibrium for the organized sectors, provided
that lobbies represent a small fraction of the population and the weight gov-
ernment attaches to campaign contributions is high otherwise the endogenous
export policy will consist in a export tax also for the sectors organized into
lobbies. This last result is consistent with Chang (2005). Condition (33) can, in
fact, be rewritten as:
soj
p∗hj
= −
(
∂p∗hj
∂sj
)−1
1
ε∗hh
+
Ij + a
a+ σL
1
ε∗hh
+
Ij + a
a+ σL
µ∗ − 1
µ∗
, (35)
where ε∗hh =
(
∂x∗hj
∂sj
/
∂p∗hj
∂sj
)
p∗hi
x∗hj
> 0 and µ∗ = p∗hj/cj is the (variable) gross
markup set by exporters. From (35) the equilibrium subsidy is expressed as the
sum of three components.
The ﬁrst component captures the familiar terms-of-trade motive for trade
policy. In particular, it corresponds to the optimum export tax that applies in
a large country when trade policy is decided by a benevolent government. The
second component refers to the political calculus motive for trade protection
due to the existence of lobbies. The last component refers to the imperfect-
competition motive for trade protection reﬂecting the positive eﬀects on proﬁts
that can be obtained from subsidizing exportations. This last term is in fact
increasing in the markup charged on foreign sales.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis and Comparative Statics
In order to provide further intuition on our previous results we now analyze the
equilibrium conditions providing some comparative statics analyses. The equi-
librium policy can be easily characterized graphically through linear schedules
that represent government's marginal gain and marginal loss due to a change in
the trade policy for a given foreign trade policy. For the sake of exposition in
what follows we treat import and export policy separately.
3.3.1 The equilibrium import tariﬀ
The ﬁrst order condition (27) for the equilibrium tariﬀ can be decomposed into
government's marginal gain (TMG) and marginal loss (TML) such that the
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equilibrium implies TMG = TML, where we deﬁne:
TMG ≡ Ij + a
a+ σL
λj
[
∂phj
∂τj
xhj + (phj − cj) ∂xhj
∂τj
]
− (1− λj)∂pfj
∂τj
xfj ,(36)
TML ≡ λj ∂phj
∂τj
xhj − (1− λj)∂xfj
∂τj
τj . (37)
Government's gain due to a marginal increase in the tariﬀ stems from two
sources: (i) higher proﬁts for the domestic ﬁrms due to the price increase on
domestic sales and due the additional domestic sales; (ii) lower producer price
on imported units, which represents the positive terms of trade eﬀect. Govern-
ment's loss due to a marginal increase in the tariﬀ originates from two sources
as well: (i) the consumer's surplus loss following the price increase on domestic
output; (ii) the reduced ﬁscal revenues due to the lower level of imports.
Given our assumptions on the structure of preferences TMG and TML are
linear functions of domestic and foreign trade policy. In particular, we can write
TMG = A(Ij) +B(Ij)s
∗
j −B(Ij)τj , (38)
TML = C −Ds∗j + Eτj , (39)
where A(Ij), B(Ij), C, D,E are all positive coeﬃcients which depend on the
parameters of the model in a complex fashion as shown in the Appendix. It can
be shown that the following inequalities hold:
A(Ij = 1) > A(Ij = 0) > C > 0, (40)
E > D > 0, (41)
and, under the assumption that goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (i.e. the
second order condition is satisﬁed), these inequalities also hold
E > B(Ij = 0) > B(Ij = 1) > D. (42)
The above relations imply that the TMG line is always negatively sloped with
respect to τ whether the sector is organized or not, while the TML line is
positively sloped. Note that the negative slope of the TMG schedules is entirely
due to the diminishing terms of trade gains associated to an increase in τ which
oﬀsets the increasing proﬁts gains deriving from higher protection. Given the
above conditions, the equilibrium tariﬀ exists and is unique for each sector.
Moreover, as long as s∗j is close to zero or suﬃciently bounded, for τ = 0, we
have
A(Ij = 1) +B(Ij = 1)s
∗
j > A(Ij = 1) +B(Ij = 1)s
∗
j , (43)
hence for τ > 0 the marginal gain curve when a sector is organized lies above
that representing the marginal gain when a sector is not organized so implying
that the equilibrium tariﬀ is higher when a sector is politically represented. This
seems the most likely case and is represented in Figure 1a, where we plot the
TML curve and the TMG curves for Ij = 1 and Ij = 0. We also plot a vertical
dotted line corresponding to the welfare-maximizing import tariﬀ.
Consider now the eﬀects of an increase in the foreign export subsidy s∗j . In
Figure 1b the dashed lines represent the TML and TMG schedules after the
policy change. We observe that the TML schedule will shift downward, while
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both the TMG schedules will shitf upward coming closer to each other, since
the TMG schedule for the unorganized sector reacts more to the policy change.
Given condition (42) the shift of the TML line is smaller than that experienced
by the two TMG lines, so implying that the resulting equilibrium outcome entails
higher tariﬀs in all sectors.
Intuitively, on the one hand, an increase in the foreign export subsidy reduces
domestic production and producer prices, so shrinking the marginal beneﬁts, in
terms of higher proﬁts, that a sector attaches to a possible increase in τ (the term
∂phj
∂τj
xhj + (phj − cj) ∂xhj∂τj in 36 is decreasing in s∗j ). On the other hand, a higher
s∗j implies higher imports, so improving the scope for a terms of trade eﬀect
deriving form a possible increase in τ (the term
∂pfj
∂τj
xfj in 36 is increasing in s
∗
j ).
Since imports are directly aﬀected by trade policies, while domestic production
is only indirectly aﬀected, the latter eﬀect dominates, so implying that following
an increase in the foreign export subsidy, the government will set a higher tariﬀ
for both sectors. The tariﬀ increase is more pronounced in unorganized sectors,
due to the government attaching a lower weight to the eﬀects on proﬁts.
Consider now what happens if the government becomes more interested in
aggregate welfare (or equivalently less interested in campaign contributions),
i.e. an increase in a. We represent the results in Figure 1c. We observe that if
the government becomes more concerned with welfare compared to campaign
contributions the TMG line for the organized sector will shift down and become
steeper (since
∂A(Ij=1)
∂a < 0 and
∂B(Ij=1)
∂a > 0), while the TMG line for the
unorganized sector will do the opposite (since
∂A(Ij=0)
∂a > 0 and
∂B(Ij=0)
∂a < 0):
eventually the two schedules perfectly overlap for a→∞. This is intuitive since
when the governments is not interested in lobbies, there is no distinction between
sectors: the equilibrium tariﬀ is the same and it maximizes social welfare.
As regarding to the share of the population that is politically represented, an
increase in σL shifts both the TMG lines downward (since
∂A(Ij=1)
∂σL
<
∂A(Ij=0)
∂σL
<
0) and makes them steeper (since
∂B(Ij=1)
∂σL
>
∂B(Ij=0)
∂σL
> 0), which implies that
the endogenous tariﬀ will be reduced in all sectors. See Figure 1d . Intuitively,
when lobbies represent a large part of the population, they cannot ignore the
eﬀect of trade policies on consumers welfare. Indeed, recall that, in the current
framework, lobbies do take into account the eﬀect of trade policies on their mem-
bers as consumers; hence, the higher the fraction of the population in lobbies,
the lower the marginal gain from a tariﬀ, which negatively aﬀects politically
represented consumers. There are two extreme cases to be considered. First, for
σL → 1 condition (26) boils down to (25) for Ij = 1, implying that for organized
sectors the endogenous tariﬀ will correspond to the social optimum level. Sec-
ond, for σL → 0 condition (26) boils down to (25) for Ij = 0, implying that for
unorganized sectors the endogenous tariﬀ will correspond to the social optimum
level.4
4Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) provide an interesting interpretation of the parame-
ter σL highlighting the fact that when setting up campaign contributions, lobbies consider
elements from the indirect utility of the population they represent. This, indeed, is the key
element through which rivalry among lobbies is introduced into the model: lobbies care about
rents, but also take into account the fact that owners of the industry speciﬁc factor, as con-
sumers, will be negatively aﬀected by tariﬀs. While this, within a perfectly rational and full
information framework, seems normal, they claim that it is actually "awkward" to assume
that lobby consider these kind of general equilibrium connections. Moreover, the rivalry we
see between industries in practice in not of this type, but rather due to concerns about in-
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The comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium import tariﬀ can be
summarized as follows.
Result 1
Given the assumption of the model, provided that the foreign export subsidy
is relatively small in absolute value, then the equilibrium tariﬀs are such that:
(i) an increase in the foreign export subsidy increases the tariﬀs in all sectors,
the unorganized sectors being more responsive:
∂τoj (Ij=0)
∂s∗j
>
∂τoj (Ij=1)
∂s∗j
> 0;
(ii) an increase in the government's interest in social welfare, implies a tar-
iﬀ increase in unorganized sectors and a decrease in organized sectors:
∂τoj (Ij=0)
∂a > 0,
∂τoj (Ij=1)
∂a < 0;
(iii) an increase in the fraction of the population represented by lobbies, implies
a decrease of import tariﬀs in all sectors, the organized sectors being more
responsive:
∂τoj (Ij=1)
∂σL
<
∂τoj (Ij=0)
∂σL
< 0.
3.3.2 The equilibrium export subsidy
The ﬁrst-order condition for the equilibrium export tariﬀ can be decomposed
into marginal gain and marginal loss such that the equilibrium implies SMG =
SML, where we deﬁne:
SMG ≡ Ij + a
a+ σL
[
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj +
(
p∗hj − cj
) ∂x∗hj
∂sj
]
, (44)
SML ≡ x∗hj + sj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
. (45)
Government's gain due to a marginal increase in the export subsidy originates
from higher proﬁts for the domestic exporters, which come from higher prices
on already exported units and from new proﬁts from additional exports. The
marginal loss comes entirely from the ﬁscal cost of the subsidy. In fact, the addi-
tional subsidy is applied to already exported units, x∗hj , while the entire amount
of the subsidy applies to newly exported goods, sj
∂x∗hj
∂sj
. In this framework the
subsidy has no eﬀect on the domestic consumer surplus.
Government marginal gains and losses can be expressed as linear functions
of domestic and foreign trade policy variables, namely:
SMG = F (Ij)
[(
G−Hτ∗j
)
+Hsj
]
(46)
SML =
(
G−Hτ∗j
)
+ 2Hsj , (47)
where all parameters are positive and depend on the parameters of the model
as demonstrated in the Appendix.
put costs and intermediate products. Imposing σL = 0 eliminates this issue, but, as noted
above, it also eliminates rivalry among lobbies, thus making the model trivial. They propose
an intellectually appealing solution, which is to assume that lobbies represent very particular
interests such that σL can be reasonably approximated by zero, but still lobbies exists. The
case analyzed by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) can be easily reproduced in our model.
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It can be shown that following inequalities hold provided that goods are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and that the second-order condition (34) is satisﬁed
F (Ij = 0) < 1 < F (Ij = 1) < 2, (48)
G−Hτ∗j > 0, (49)
where the latter is veriﬁed for any feasible foreign import tariﬀ. The above
conditions imply that the political equilibrium entails a subsidy in organized
sectors and an export tax in unorganized sectors as stated in Proposition 2 and
shown in Figure 2a.
Consider now what happens to the endogenous export policy when there is
a change in the respective foreign import policy. In Figure 2b we show that an
increase in the foreign import tariﬀ τ∗j will cause all schedules to shift downward,
however the SMG line for organized sectors will shift more than the SML line,
which in turn will shift more than the SMG line for unorganized sectors. As a
result, equilibrium subsidy will move towards free trade in any sector, i.e. the
equilibrium subsidy is reduced in organized sectors and the equilibrium export
tax is reduced in unorganized sectors.
Clearly, an increase in the foreign import tariﬀ makes exporting more diﬃcult
reducing the level of production exported and the corresponding producer price,
so decreasing the marginal beneﬁts in terms of higher proﬁts deriving from a
higher level of subsidy (i.e. the term
∂p∗hj
∂sj
x∗hj+
(
p∗hj − cj
)
∂x∗hj
∂sj
in 44 is decreasing
in τ∗j ). This explains the downward shift of both SMG curves, which is magniﬁed
in the organized sector, due to the fact that the government attaches a higher
weight to the negative eﬀects on proﬁts. The SML lines simply shifts downward,
since a higher import tariﬀ levied by the foreign country reduces the marginal
cost of an increase in the export subsidy (i.e. x∗hj in 45 goes down).
We now look at the case when the government becomes more interested in
aggregate welfare, i.e. an increase in a. See Figure 2c. In this case the SMG line
for the organized sector rotates downward (given that
∂F (Ij=1)
∂a < 0), while the
SMG line for the unorganized sector rotates upward (given that
∂F (Ij=0)
∂a > 0),
so implying a lower export subsidy for the former and a lower export tax for the
latter. This is due to the fact that when the government becomes less interested
in lobbies, the distinction between sectors vanishes: the equilibrium subsidy
moves towards the social optimum.
Finally, an increase in the share of the population that is politically rep-
resented, σL, shifts downward both SMG lines and make them ﬂatter (in fact
∂F (Ij)
∂σL
< 0), implying a lower endogenous subsidy for organized sectors and a
higher export tax for unorganized sectors. The intuition is analogous to that of
an import tariﬀ: as the lobbies represent a higher fraction of the population,
they become more concerned about the ﬁscal burden that an expensive export
policy imposes on consumers.
The comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium export subsidy is sum-
marized by following result:
Result 2
Given the assumption of the model, then the equilibrium export subsidies are
such that:
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(i) an increase in the foreign import tariﬀ decreases the subsidy in organized
sectors and decreases the export tax in unorganized sectors:
∂soj (Ij=1)
∂τ∗j
< 0,
∂soj (Ij=0)
∂τ∗j
> 0;
(ii) an increase in the government's interest in social welfare, implies a subsidy
decrease in organized sectors and an export tax decrease in unorganized
sectors:
∂soj (Ij=1)
∂a < 0,
∂τoj (Ij=0)
∂a > 0;
(iii) an increase in the fraction of the population represented by lobbies, im-
plies a subsidy decrease in organized sectors and an export tax increase in
unorganized sectors:
∂τoj (Ij=1)
∂σL
< 0,
∂τoj (Ij=0)
∂σL
< 0.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate how a monopolistic competition market structure,
which allows for markups to vary in response to trade policy shifts, is able to
aﬀect the equilibrium tariﬀ and subsidy set by a government inﬂuenced by po-
litical contributions of lobbies. We show that in each sector trade policy is the
result of a non-trivial interplay of diﬀerent mechanisms each of which pushing
the economy away from free trade. We ﬁnd that for sectors organized into inter-
est groups the endogenous import tariﬀ is always positive and inversely related
to the degree of import penetration, consistently with previous theoretical ﬁnd-
ings. On the other hand, for sectors which are not represented by a lobby the
endogenous import policy can be a tariﬀ or a subsidy, depending on the trade
policy exerted by the foreign country, and is found to be inversely related to the
level of import penetration, provided that the importance that the government
attaches to aggregate welfare and/or the gross markup on domestic sales are
relatively high. Clearly, this last ﬁnding may in part explain why also indus-
tries classiﬁed as unorganized receive positive levels of trade protection. Finally,
turning to exportations, we ﬁnd that the endogenous export policy turns out to
be an export subsidy for organized sectors and an export tax for unorganized
sectors. We argue that future research should address the empirical relevance of
the protection-for-sales class of models taking into account the role played by
the market structure in shaping the equilibrium trade policy.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from zero restriction on imports (i.e. τj = 0), given the expressions for
equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), a lobby's marginal welfare
(24) is found to be
∂Wi (τ, s)
∂τj
= (δj − σi)λjN γ (1− λj)
2 (2β − γ)
[
α− cj
2β − γ −
γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)s
∗
j
]
(A.1)
+ δjλjN
γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)
[
α (β − γ) + βcj
2β − γ −
γ (1− λj)
2 (2β − γ)s
∗
j − cj
]
+ σiN(1− λj)2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (2β − γ)
[
α− cj
2β − γ +
2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)s
∗
j
]
,
where for organized sectors (i.e. j = i and δi = 1) we have that
∂Wi (τ, s)
∂τi
> 0 if s∗i > s
∗
i = −
4 (β − γ) [σi (β − γ) + γλi] (α− ci)
2γ2λi (λi − 1) + σi
[
4 (β − γ)2 + γλi (4β − 3γ)
] .
Since this critical value for the foreign export tax, s∗i , is strictly lower than
its prohibitive counterpart under the assumption that τi = 0, namely s
∗NT
i [τi =
0] = − 2(β−γ)(α−ci)2(β−γ)+γλi , the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1 is proved. For unorganized sectors
(i.e. j 6= i and δj = 0), ∂Wi(τ,s)∂τj > 0 if s∗j > s
∗
j = − 4(β−γ)
2(α−cj)
4(β−γ)2+γλj(4β−3γ) .
Since this critical value for the foreign export tax, s
∗
j is strictly larger that its
prohibitive counterpart under the assumption that τi = 0, namely s
∗NT
i [τi =
0] = − 2(β−γ)(α−ci)2(β−γ)+γλi , the second part of Lemma 1 is proved. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Starting from zero restriction on imports (i.e. τj = 0), given the expressions
for equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), the social marginal
welfare is
∂W (τ, s)
∂τj
= Nλj
γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)
[
α (β − γ) + βcj
2β − γ −
γ (1− λj)
2 (2β − γ)s
∗
j − cj
]
+
(A.2)
+N(1− λj)2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (2β − γ)
[
α− cj
2β − γ +
2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)s
∗
j
]
.
which is increasing in tariﬀ only if s∗j > s˜
∗
j = − 4(β−γ)[(β−γ)+γλj ](α−cj)4(β−γ)2+γλj(4β−3γ)−2γ2λj(1−λj) .
Since this critical value for the foreign export tax, s˜∗j , is strictly lower than
its prohibitive counterpart under the assumption that τj = 0, namely s˜
∗
j <
s∗NTj [τj = 0] < 0, Lemma 2 is proved. 
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Proof of Proposition 1
Starting from zero restriction on imports (i.e. τj = 0), given the expressions for
equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), then the marginal eﬀect
of a tariﬀ on government's welfare can be written as:
∂G˜ (τ, s)
∂τj
= (Ij − σL)λjN γ (1− λj)
2 (2β − γ)
[
α− cj
2β − γ −
γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)s
∗
j
]
+
(A.3)
+ (Ij + a)λjN
γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)
[
α (β − γ) + βcj
2β − γ −
γ (1− λj)
2 (2β − γ)s
∗
j − cj
]
+
+ (a+ σL)N(1− λj)2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (2β − γ)
[
α− cj
2β − γ +
2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)s
∗
j
]
,
which is increasing in an import tariﬀ only if
s∗j > ŝ
∗
j = −
4 (β − γ) [(β − γ) (a+ σL) + γλj (a+ Ij)] (α− cj)[
4 (β − γ)2 + γλj (4β − 3γ)
]
(a+ σL)− 2γ2λj (1− λj) (a+ Ij)
,
where ŝ∗j < s
∗NT
j [τj = 0] < 0 if
a+σL
a+Ij
< 2. This last inequality holds for
organized sectors since Ij = 1 so showing the result in the ﬁrst part of the
Proposition. For unorganized sectors, since Ij = 0,
∂G˜(τ,s)
∂τj
is strictly positive
provided that σL < a, so proving the second part of the Proposition. If, instead
σL > a , the government welfare is increasing (decreasing),
∂G˜(τ,s)
∂τj
> (<)0, in
an import tariﬀ if s∗j > (<)ŝ
∗
j . This proves the third part of the Proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 3
Starting from zero subsidy on exports (i.e. sj = 0), given the expressions for
equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), a lobby's marginal welfare
(24) is found to be
∂Wi (τ, s)
∂sj
= λjN
∗
(
2β − γ − γλj
2β − γ δj − σi
)
(A.4)[
α− cj
2β − γ −
2β − γ − γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)τ
∗
j
]
.
Since the second term of the above expression is always positive for any feasi-
ble foreign import tariﬀ, namely for τ∗j < τ
∗NT
j [sj = 0], where τ
∗NT
i [si = 0] =
2(β−γ)(α−ci)
2(β−γ)+γ(1−λi) is the prohibitive foreign import tariﬀ at sj = 0, then
∂Wi(τ,s)
∂sj
>
0 if
2β−γ−γλj
2β−γ δj − σi > 0. For organized sectors (i.e. j = i and δi = 1), this
condition is satisﬁed provided that goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (i.e. β−γ
is large enough), so proving the ﬁrst part of the Lemma. For unorganized sectors
(i.e. j 6= i and δj = 0), the condition is never satisﬁed and ∂Wi(τ,s)∂sj < 0 for any
feasible foreign import tariﬀ. 
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Proof of Lemma 4
Starting from zero subsidy on exports (i.e. sj = 0), given the expressions for
equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), the social marginal welfare
is
∂W (τ, s)
∂sj
= N∗
γλ2j
2β − γ
[
2β − γ − γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)τ
∗
j −
α− cj
2β − γ
]
, (A.5)
from which immediately follows that for any feasible foreign import tariﬀ,
τ∗j < τ
∗NT
j [sj = 0] , the model displays a negative marginal eﬀect on aggregate
welfare of an export subsidy, i.e. ∂W (τ,s)∂sj < 0, so implying that a tax on exports
is welfare improving. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Starting from zero restriction on exports (i.e. sj = 0), given the expressions for
equilibrium prices (11)-(14) and quantities (15)-(18), then the marginal eﬀect
of a subsidy on government's welfare can be written as:
∂G˜ (τ, s)
∂sj
= λjN
∗
[
(Ij + a)
2β − γ − γλj
2β − γ − (a+ σL)
]
(A.6)[
α− cj
2β − γ −
2β − γ − γλj
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ)τ
∗
j
]
,
Since the second term of the above expression is always positive for any feasible
foreign import tariﬀ, namely for τ∗j < τ
∗NT
j [sj = 0], where τ
∗NT
i [si = 0] =
2(β−γ)(α−ci)
2(β−γ)+γ(1−λi) is the prohibitive foreign import tariﬀ at sj = 0, then
∂G˜(τ,s)
∂sj
> 0
if a+σLIj+a <
2β−γ−γλj
2β−γ . For organized sectors, since Ij = 1, this condition holds
provided that goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (i.e. β − γ is large enough) so
proving the ﬁrst part of the Proposition. For unorganized sectors since Ij = 0
this condition is never satisﬁed so implying that the equilibrium export policy
will consist in a tax. This proves the second part of the Proposition 
Comparative Statics
The Equilibrium Import Tariﬀ
Government's marginal gain and marginal loss can be written in a linear form
as TMG = A(Ij) + B(Ij)s
∗
j − B(Ij)τj and TML = C −Ds∗j + Eτj , where all
parameters are positive and are a combination of the parameters of the model
deﬁned as follows:
A(Ij) ≡
[
Ij + a
a+ σL
λjγ
2β − γ +
2 (β − γ) + γλj
2 (2β − γ)
]
(1− λj) (α− cj)
2β − γ ;
B(Ij) ≡
[
(2 (β − γ) + γλj)2
2 (2β − γ) −
Ij + a
a+ σL
λj (1− λj) γ2
2β − γ
]
1− λj
2 (2β − γ) (β − γ) ;
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C =
γλj (1− λj) (α− cj)
2 (2β − γ)2 ;
D ≡ γ
2λj (1− λj)2
4 (β − γ) (2β − γ)2 ;
E ≡
[
γ2λj (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ) +
2 (β − γ) + γλj
β − γ
]
1− λj
2 (2β − γ) .
The Equilibrium Export Subsidy
Government's marginal gain and marginal loss can be written in a linear form as
SMG = F (Ij)
[(
G−Hτ∗j
)
+Hsj
]
and SML =
(
G−Hτ∗j
)
+ 2Hsj , where all
parameters are positive and are a combination of the parameters fo the model
deﬁned as follows:
F (Ij) ≡ Ij + a
a+ σL
2 (β − γ) + γ (1− λj)
2β − γ = 2
Ij + a
a+ αL
∂p∗hj
∂sj
;
G ≡ α− cj
2β − γ = x
FT
j ;
H ≡ 2 (β − γ) + γ (1− λj)
2 (β − γ) (2β − γ) =
∂x∗hj
∂sj
.
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Figure 1: Endogenous Import Policy and Comparative Statics
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Figure 2: Endogenous Export Policy and Comparative Statics
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